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NuminER I

THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL*

By RoSCoE POUND.**

Plato tells us that, of all kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of
good laws may do most for the learner. A deep study of the science
of law, he adds, may do more than all other writing to give
soundness to our judgment and stability to the state. Indeed, he
goes so far as to claim for it that it will confirm and advance the
good in their goodness and reclaim the bad, except that incorrigible
remnant for whom he conceives there is no help short of the gallows. It is true this high estimate of the study of law has two
presuppositions that must give us pause. For one thing, the philosopher was thinking and writing of study of an ideal body of laws
devised for an ideal social and political order, not of study of the
code of legal precepts that happens to obtain at a given time in a
given state. For another thing, he writes under the influence of the
Socratic identification of wickedness with"ignorance and the belief
that when men are well informed as to the right they will not go
wrong. Thus it might be questioned whether the study of law
in a professional school is the same thing as that study of law
which Plato commends so highly. Also it is not so clear to us today that we may combat evil with mere learning. With full allowance for this last consideration, however, we still have warrant
for high claims for study of the science of law.
But, some one will say, is it a science of law that you study in
* Address delivered at the Dedication of the West Virginia University College
of Law building, November 17, 1923.
*S Dean of Harvard Law School.
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the professional school of today? You study the Anglo-American
common law. You study that common law in its practical application as set forth in the reported decisions of the courts. You
investigate, not the principles of justice nor the ideal of the social
and legal order, but the recorded experience of the administration
of justice among English-speaking peoples. You study these
materials in order to train lawyers for the practice of their profession. How are these things to achieve even a large measure of
what Plato expected from the science of law?
Plato called for knowledge of good laws and for deep study of
the science of law. We set up law schools to teach "law."
But
are these the same? Does "law" include "good laws"? Does the
teaching of "law" involve deep study of the science of law? What
is "law"?
To the lay mind the answer is simple: Law is an aggregate of
laws, and laws are rules. Law is the whole body of legal precepts
that obtain in the time and place. Indeed, some jurists have acceeded to this lay view of the matter, and the analytical
school, which was conspicuous in England and America in the last
century, took this for its fundamental position. It held that lawyers were concerned only with the precepts which the state established, or which the state recognized and enforced through its
tribunals. With the goodness or badness of these precepts lawyers
had nothing to do. Nor was the science of law to go beyond an
ordering and systematizing of these precepts. If this is the sound
theory of law, and the true conception of the science of law, certainly it is not the good law and the science of law of which Plato
wrote. Moreover, if such is to be our conception, we may well
inquire whether there is much warrant for an academic school of
law. We may well ask whether the aggregate of legal precepts
applied for the time being in the particular place needs to be taught
academically-whether it is not the best and the simplest course
to learn them in the office of the practitioner, as was formerly the
custom. We may well ask, even if it be thought that these precepts may be taught best in a school, whether it is worth while to
devote large endowments and set up expensive university schools
to teach a set of precepts that may be repealed by the next legislature.
In truth the matter is by no means as simple as the common
sense of the laymen or the dogmatism of the analytical jurist make
it appear. There is much more in law than a mere aggregate of
legal precepts. Legal precepts are something much more com-
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plicated than the baseball rules or the football rules, or the constitutions and by-laws of clubs and fraternal orders, or the army
regulations, or even than the municipal penal ordinances. Good
laws in the sense of ideals are a large element in the apparatus by
which causes are decided every day in the tribunals, And the
science of law must take account of this element if it is to give
us a true picture of the legal precepts that obtain for the moment.
Likewise the science of law must do more than arrange and systematize those precepts. It must investigate the way they are given
shape and are eked out and are developed with reference to ideals
and by means of a juristic and judicial technique. It must investigate the means by which abstract formulas are made into living
instruments of justice in their interpretation and application.
Such a science of law may indeed give soundness to our judgment
and stability to the state. It is no less a science that is taught in the
American law school.
Three elements go to make up the law. The first element is
legal precepts, the element to which Bentham referred when he
said that law was an aggregate of laws. The second element is
a traditional technique of deciding cases; a technique of finding
the grounds of decision in legislation supplemented by traditional
legal materials, or, in the absence of legislation, on the basis of
the traditional materials alone; a technique of developing and applying legal precepts whereby those precepts are supplemented,
extended, restricted, and thus adapted to the administration of
justice. The third element is a body of ideas as to the end or
purpose of law and as to what legal precepts ought to be in view
thereof, an ideal picture of the social order with consequent pictures of the details of the legal ordering of society, with reference to which legal precepts and the traditional technique of decision are developed and applied and are continually given new
shape or new content or new application in the changing circumstances of life.
No one questions that legal precepts are law. But if we mean
by law that body of materials by means of which the courts decide
the controversies that come before them, legal precepts are not all
of the law. Indeed, it is impossible for them to be all of the law.
Human wisdom does not suffice to provide a complete and perfect
body of precepts for which no supplement and no gloss will be
needed, and in which every human controversy can find its exact
preappointed solution. No matter what the legal precepts may be
for the time being, no matter what the last legislature may have
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prescribed or the justices of the highest appellate tribunal may
have announced in the last lot of opinions handed down, interpretations and distinctions and analogical extensions and logical inferences and equitable applications will be called for by the infinite variety of human life to which the precepts must be applied.
The precepts, the statutes, the judicial opinions will prove to be
but materials from which tribunals must construct grounds .of decision for states of fact which those who formulated the precepts,
those who drew the statutes, those who wrote the opinions had
never been called upon to consider. They are able to do this because of a certain judicial and juristic craftsmanship, because of
a traditional technique, because of habits of mind which are the
most enduring features of a legal system.
By way of example, consider four settled habits of mind of the
common law lawyer-his attitude as to the force to be given to
judicial decisions, his attitude toward specific redress and substituted redress, his attitude toward legislation, and his tendency to
think in terms of relations. As a matter of course he attributes
to judicial decision a controlling force in the decision of subsequent
cases. As a matter of course he regards substituted redress as the
normal type and specific redress as something exceptional, reserved
for cases for which substituted redress is not adequate. As a
matter of course he regards a statutory rule as something introduced arbitrarily into the general body of the common law, without
any necessary or systematic relation thereto, in order to govern
some special situation, and hence governing that situation only.
As a matter of course he thinks in terms of relation-of husband
and wife, landlord and tenant, master and servant, principal and
agent, principal and surety, vendor and purchaser. So completely
do these mental habits shape his legal thinking that he is at a
loss to understand how the lawyers of half the world can think
in radically different fashion upon each point. The civil-law
lawyer finds his common law in texts and conceives of a judicial
decision as determining nothing beyond the case in which it was
rendered. He thinks of specific redress as normal and substituted
redress as exceptional. He reasons by analogy from legislative
texts and confines the force of a settled line of adjudication to
the exact proposition it establishes. He thinks of will, where we
think of relation, and speaks of the law of persons or family law,
of usufruct, of the contract of letting services, of the contract of
mandate, of the contract of suretyship, and of the contract of
sale. We have a traditional technique of deciding with reference
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to the judicial decisions of the past, a traditional technique of
developing the grounds of decision of particular cases on the basis
of reported judicial experience. The civilian has a traditional
technique of construing legal texts, and a traditional technique of
developing the grounds of decision therefrom. In each case the art
of working with legal precepts is more significant than the details
of the legal precepts themselves.
But the administration of justice involves more than the interpreting and applying of given precepts by means of a traditional
technique. It happens continually that courts must choose between
competing principles, developing the one and distinguishing the
other. They must choose to apply this precept by analogy and
thus to extend its scope, and to restrict that precept that might
well cover the case. They must choose to go in one path of legal
analogy and not in another, where both lie open before them. The
choice is not one of inexorable logic. Nor is it a matter of mere
personal inclination or personal caprice. It is governed by settled
ideals of the end of law and of what the legal order, and hence
what legal precepts, should be in view thereof. These ideals give
the background upon which judicial decision and juristic writing
are projected. They determine the choice of starting points for
judicial and juristic reasoning, the choice of analogies, and the
selection of the concrete materials with which to fill out abstract
formulas. Consider the test of applicability to American conditions that played a determining part in the formative period of
American common law. How did courts ascertain what was applicable and what was not? There were no precepts defining applicability. The phrase had no historical content. They could
only refer to an idealized picture of pioneer, rural, agricultural
America of the fore part of the nineteenth century. That picture
became part of the law. Other such pictures may be seen in
connection with the criteria of conformity to "the nature of free
government" or conformity to the "nature of American government" or to the "nature of American institutions," which have
served as the basis of so many decisions on constitutional law;
in connection with the hypothetical "old law of England," that
idealization of parts of the medieval law to which so many things
were referred a generation ago; and in connection with "the common law as it was at the time of colonization," an idealization of
seventeenth-century law in terms and for purposes of the present,
which still serves as the basis of decision in more than one of our
commonwealths.
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Nor are the legal precepts that make up the first and most
obvious element of the law merely a body of simple commands
and prohibitions. There are, indeed, many rules-many precepts
in which a definite detailed legal consequence is attached to a definite detailed state of facts. But the lawyer knows well that he may
seldom expect to find such a rule precisely applicable to his problem. Often he can hope only to find a principle-a generalization
giving an authoritative premise for judicial and juristic reasoning.
Often he must turn to some legal conception-to some critically defined type of situation to which he may refer or by which he
may measure the facts of the case before him and thus find a
basis for legal reasoning. Often there is no more than a standarda general measure of conduct, to be applied with reference to the
circumstances of each case, with wide margins of application, and
an ultimate reference to what is fair and reasonable on the particular facts.
Thus rules are no more than a small fraction of the whole that
we call law. Often they are the least stable part of the law.
In a large view they are the least significant part. If one doubt
this, let him compare the rules of 1800 with those of 1830, of
1860, of 1890, and of today. 'Where is the learning of real actions
of 1800? Where are the nice rules of common law pleading of
1830? Where are the pedantic distinctions of bailments that
obtained in 1860, or the minute precepts as to appellate procedure
and error in trials at law that were at the height of their vogue in
1890? Yet how stable have principles and conceptions proved
in comparison. If our law schools taught rules only, their teaching would be built upon the sand. It is because they must teach
and do teach principles and conceptions and how to use them,
standards and how to apply them, the traditional technique of the
lawyers' and judges' craft, and the traditional ideals of what law
is and what it is for-it is for these reasons that we may assert
for the law school what Plato claimed for the study of law. When
we train common-law lawyers, i. e., lawyers bred in the traditional
art of decision that has grown up among English-speaking peoples,
we give soundness to judgment and stability to the state. For
our Anglo-American polity is a legal polity and our political institutions are legal institutions. But we seek to make common-law
lawyers in whose hands the tradition shall further the progress
of civilization. We seek to train common-law lawyers in whose
hands the traditional Anglo-American technique of working out
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the grounds of decision from the judicial experience of the past
shall continue to be an instrument of justice. In Plato's phrase,
we seek to transmit a knowledge of good laws.
Although legal precepts in the narrowest sense, i. e., rules attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed
state of facts, are the staple of ancient codes, it is not true, even in
the beginnings of law, that the law is a mere body of legal precepts.
In the beginning law is scarcely set off from other forms of social
control. There is an undifferentiated social control by religion, ethical custom, and enacted rules. Hence knowledge of the traditional
religious precepts and of the traditionally established ethical custom, as well as knowledge of the traditional interpretation of the
written law, is even more important for the administration of
justice than knowledge of the precepts promulgated in the code.
Thus legal education is as old as law. For although the promulgated precepts are written out for all to read, the tradition must
be transmitted through some sort of instruction. With the evolution of the legal order and development of the elaborate systems
of the maturity of law, the relative significance of authoritatively
established rules becomes even less and the demand for legal education continually increases.
In the modern world, legal education takes three forms: The
Continental academic type, running back to legal education in
ancient Rome; the English apprentice type, going back to the
medieval conception of the profession as analogous to a craft, with
its own government, its own traditional art or mystery, and its
own instruction by the neophyte's serving as apprentice to a
master; and the American academic professional type, growing out
of the inapplicability of the English type to the conditions of the
formative period of American law and the need of a rapid working over and adaptation of seventeenth-century English law in
order to make of it a common law for America.
In the beginning of Roman law, the little-differentiated or
undifferentiated body of religious precepts, ethical custom, and
legal rules, by which the social order was maintained, was a tradition of the pontifices. Except as codified by the Twelve Tables,
down to the fourth century B. 0. this tradition was possessed exclusively by the patricians, who alone were eligible to the priesthood. The great man who knew the tradition sat in the court of
his house and advised his dependents, drew legal documents for
them, and, if need was, conducted causes for them. A turning
point in legal history is the secularization of the law, which took
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place at Rome at the opening of the fourth century B. C. As
a part of this process of secularization, the first plebeian pontifex
maximus began to give consultations in public, so that students
could listen and take notes. Also those who knew the. law began
to give advice to all comers, and had hearers, as they were called,
who attended the consultations, learned the tradition and the
traditional art, and in time, when they had become learned in the
law, might themselves sit and give counsel. Thus in place of the
priestly caste who have a class monopoly of the tradition, we get
a profession with a sort of professional monopoly. When, in the
reign of Augustus, the jurisconsults come to be licensed by the
emperor, the transition is complete. At least as far back as the
reign of Augustus we find that the jurisconsult is both counsellor
and teacher, and this double function continues through the classical period. Not only do students attend consultations and take
notes, but the jurisconsult lectures to them and even writes institutional treatises for them. Moreover, there is evidence that
there were teachers of law in the classical period who were not
practitioners.
Law schools as such developed in the period of maturity of law.
The school of most importance was at Berytus, which in the fifth
century was the chief seat of legal learning. The teachers of law
in this school were men of culture, learned in the classical law,
and possessed of an academic legal science only just short of the
practical legal science of the classical jurists. From their time
to the present, the academic law school has been the chiefest factor in the development of Roman law. Their notes upon the
classical texts, editing them and bringing them down to date as
statements of the actual law, as well as interpreting them and
putting their details into a harmonious, logically constructed system, prepared the way for Justinian's Digest, which is the common
law of at least half of the world today.
There is evidence of a continuity of law teaching in Italy from
the law schools of Justinian's time to the rise of the great medieval
teachers of law at Bologna in the twelfth century. Thus in a
sense the methods of the school at Berytus set the standard for
the teaching of Roman law for the modern morld. But beyond
this, the conditions of teaching at fifth-century Berytus and in
twelfth-century Italy were the same. In the maturity of law in
the ancient world, the writings of the chief jurisconsults of the
classical era had been given statutory authority. Hence the task
of the teacher was to interpret and expound these texts of the
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second and third centuries as a living body of law for the fifth and
sixth centuries. In the same way in twelfth-century Italy the task
was to interpret and expound the codification of Roman law by
Justinian in the sixth century as a universal law of Christendom six
centuries later. Thus from the beginning legal education in the
modern Roman law was a training in the interpretation and application of written texts.
To understand the academic juristic method of the medieval
Roman law, we must remember that medieval thought assumed
the existence of a universal Christian society, which on its temporal side was a continuation of the ancient Roman empire. Postulating the continuity of the empire, the Corpus Juris was authoritative legislation binding upon the empire over which Justinian
had ruled. It was an age of authority. Hence all that seemed permissible was analysis of the text and interpretation. Thinking
of the Digest of Justinian as a statute and so of every text as
written at one time, the academic teachers sought by means of
analysis and formal logic to reconcile conflicting texts, to develop
the implied content of each text, and to carry out the content to
all its logical conclusions. As academic teaching of Roman law
became the practical teaching of law for western Europe, a great
part of the work of the teachers was application of the texts to
hypothetical cases, leading to distinctions, analogical extensions,
and generalizations in the form of maxims. Thus we get two characteristics of Roman-law teaching that persist to this day. First,
it is primarily a teaching of the art of using authoritative texts
as the basis for administering justice. Second, it is an academic
teaching upon the basis of purely hypothetical cases and the opinions of the doctors as to the proper application of the texts to
these cases. In consequence it has no immediate relation to actual
cases. It ignores judicial experience. It discusses opinions on the
texts and academic solutions of hypothetical cases, conceiving of
the texts as laying down universal propositions, raising universal
questions, and to be interpreted for all times, all places, and all
men.
In the sixteenth century, the Humanists gave another direction
to academic teaching of Roman law. The scholastic dialectical
apparatus of the commentators, well adapted to organize any
particular topic of the law, involved so diffuse and elaborate an
exposition that only a small portion of the law could be treated
in the reasonable limits of academic lectures. At most the professor could expound a few texts during a term, and for the rest
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the student must read by himself. The Humanists began to work
out a system of Roman law as a whole. They engaged in a systematic exposition of the law derived from the texts instead of an
exposition of the texts in their own order. Thus begins that search
for a universal systematic arrangement, that quest for an analytical scheme whereby the whole law may be exhibited as a complete
body of harmonious, logically interdependent precepts, flowing logically from a small number of established fundamental propositions, which has been characteristic of civilian exposition of law
ever since and has exercised a profound influence upon systematic ideas in our own law.
After the Reformation and the consequent downfall of the
canon law as an everyday agency of social control, Roman law was
left in possession of the field as the one system of law with claims
to universality. But by this time the idea of the continuity of the
empire, and of the binding force of the Corpus Juris as authoritative legislation for all Christendom had broken down. It was apparent to jurists that they must find some test of the authority
of a legal precept, or of a juristic principle, other than the text of
the Corpus Juris. Accordingly lawyers began to study the actual
course of decision in the courts in order to ascertain what parts
of the Corpus Juris had been received as customary law and what
had not. Thus they worked out the usus modernus pandectarum
as a recognized system. Meanwhile the academic jurists sought to
find a philosophical basis for the reception of Roman law upon
which to rest the authority of its rules. This quest led them to
adopt reason as the ultimate test of the validity of a legal precept.
The result was a liberal, creative period, strikingly analogous to
the classical period of Roman law in the ancient world. But in
large part they assumed that the Roman law was embodied reason
and reconciled authority with their rationalist philosophy in this
way.
At the end of the 18th century and in the 19th century the law
was codified in substantially the whole of the Roman-law world.
But the modern codes assume a background of the modern Roman
law, which is the common law in all the jurisdictions in which
these codes obtain. Also the technique of development of code precepts, the technique of application of the codes, and the technique
of judicial decision on the basis thereof, are the technique of the
modern Roman law, derived from the classical Roman law and
developed academically in the modern world. Hence in the Romanlaw world legal education is and must be a Roman-law education
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for the same reason that with us legal education is and must be
a common-law education. Also it must be an academic education
because the modern Roman law is a university-made law. Its spirit
is the spirit of the university. Its organs are academic treatises.
Its oracles are academic teachers. The great names in the civil
law are not the names of great judges, or of great advocates. They
are the names of great teachers.
If, then, the method of teaching law in the world of the modern
Roman law is an academic method, by lectures and study of academic commentaries on authoritative texts, and of academic doctrinal treatises, it is because the modern Roman law demands such
instruction. It is a university-made law. From its beginnings
in ancient Rome, its technique has been a technique of developing
and applying written texts, and its oracles have been teachers and
academic commentators, not judges. Those who would introduce
this method as a method of legal teaching in our law should reflect upon the intimate connection between the academic teaching of Roman law and the traditional technique which is taught
thereby. They should consider how far such a method consists
with the genius of our technique which has a wholly different history and has been developed by wholly different agencies.
For the common law, our story begins in the 13th century. In
that century our law passes definitely into a stage of strict law,
and it reaches its classical era in the 17th century. In the form
which it took in the latter century it was received as the common
law of America. Two points of contrast with the Roman law are
decisive. In the first place, it had few or no authoritative texts.
There are, it is true, Magna Charta, and the legislation of Edward
I. But there is no complete authoritative statement. Bracton's
treatise, "The Crown and flower of English medieval jurisprudence", was not official and did not receive legislative sanction,
as did the classical Roman treatises, nor become the subject of commentary. The common law was the work of the King's justices,
sitting in the King's courts and applying reason to judicial experience, rather than to juristic or legislative texts. For, in the
next place, we must note that whereas in the classical Roman
practice the judge was appointed for each case pro hacrvice, and
was not a learned lawyer, from the 13th century at least, the judges
of the King's courts are permanent magistrates learned in the
law. A Roman iudex could not follow his own decisions because
he was not a permanent judge. He would not follow another iudex
because the latter was not a learned lawyer and his opinion car-
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tied no weight. What counted was the opinion of the learned
jurisconsult on which the iudex acted. The common-law judge,
on the other hand, tended to follow his own decisions because he
held a permanent office, and he tended to follow the decisions of
other judges because they were learned lawyers and it was natural
to imitate them. Thus from the outset the common-law technique
becomes one of applying judicial experience-one of developing
the grounds of decision out of the reported decisions of the past.
What may fairly be called reports of decisions begin in the 13th
century, and the doctrine of precedents may be found in the Year
Books as early as the beginning of the 14th century.
Meanwhile, agencies of law-teaching had been growing up with
the law. In another respect the common law as a system of law begins with the 13th century. For in that century there was in
some sort a secularization of law. The non-clerical element came to
predominate upon the bench, and a profession of non-clerical
lawyers grew up to practice before the non-clerical judges. Apprentices of law were known already in the time of Edward I.
How the societies of apprentices grew up we do not know precisely. Apparently certain masters of law took pupils, and the
groups gradually expanded and became societies. After the manner of the Middle Ages, they came to be organized in colleges or
corporations, self-perpetuating and self-governing. The path to
the bar and to the bench was through these societies, not, as on
the Continent, through the Universities. Since they were societies
of professional lawyers, and practice before the courts of the common law was exclusively in their hands and in the hands of the
sergeants, a guild or order selected from among them by the King,
they controlled legal education by their control of admission to
the profession. They were made up of benchers, the governing
body, barristers and students. And the latter, after a probationary
studentship, were called to the bar by their Inn.
A member of the bar, a "reader" or lecturer, was responsible
during his term for teaching the students. The instruction was
partly in the form of "readings" or lectures, taking the form of
analysis and exposition of a statute, or of some section of a statute.
Here we may see Roman influence, through imitation of the method
of the universities. But statutes were too small a part of the law
for these readings to suffice. And the bulk of the law, not formulated in written texts, but contained in the reported decisions, or
in the tradition of what had been decided, did not lend itself to
analytical and expository lectures in the scholastic manner. Hence
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the other form of instruction was by moots, in which students argued before a bencher and two barristers in the hall of the Inn.
These moots were of such importance that the opinions of learned
lawyers sitting in them as judges are sometimes reported, and some
of them are cited as authority today. The students learned by
observing the lawyer in action in the courts, and by trying their
hands in the moots. It was essentially an apprentice training.
We must remember that the common law was not taught in the
universities. They taught the Roman law and the canon law, but
had no professorships of English law until the 18th century. They
had the training of advocates in the ecclesiastical courts and in
Admirality, but after the 16th century, when for a time it seemed
that there might be a reception of Roman law in England, the
training of civilians became of relatively slight importance. Even
today, when the Eiglish universities are beginning to take some
part in the professional training of common-law lawyers, the basis
of the instruction is Roman law, jurisprudence, and a historical
and political introduction to law, followed by a rapid survey of
what might be called the institutes of English law. There is a palpable gulf between professional instruction and academic instruction. Nor is this gulf to be wondered at. For the common law
is not an academic system. From the beginning it has been a
law of the courts as definitely as the modern Roman law, and indeed the Roman law since the 5th century, has been a law of the
universities. The great names of English law are the names of
judges, not of teachers. Indeed it used to be that a text book of
the common law was of no persuasive authority and might not be
cited unless written by a judge. Naturally legal education in
England is as characteristically professional as legal education on
the Continent is characteristically academic. In each case there is
a decisive practical reason. For teaching of law is primarily a
teaching of the traditional technique of developing the legal materials, and of developing grounds of decision of particular cases
therefrom. In England the technique to be taught is a lawyer's
technique of developing and applying the materials to be found
in the law reports, not a teacher's technique of developing and
applying written texts.
Although we received the political institutions of 17th century
England, and in the latter part of the 18th and fore part of the
19th century, received the English common law, and although we
set up our system of courts on an English model, there were compelling reasons why the English method of legal education could
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not be taken over for America. The systematic study which had
been maintained in the Inns of Court almost to the 18th century
had degenerated in that century to a few empty forms, and until
the middle of the 19th century the real training was by study in
the office of a practitioner, reading, observing, copying precedents
and opinions, and drawing papers. In America we did not preserve the division of the profession into counsellors and attorneys.
When we received English institutions and English law, the last
remnants of the relationally organized society of the Middle Ages
were thrown over. Craft organization had become obsolete, and only a few great companies preserved its memory. A purely individualist organization of society appealed both to Puritan and to pioneer. Moreover, the conditions of rural, agricultural, pioneer society
demanded and produced a versatility, a distrust of specialization,
and a proneness to allow everyone to demonstrate freely what he
could do, that made organization of the profession in self-governing societies after the English model impossible. Immediately
after the Revolution, law and lawyers were in much disfavor; the
law because it could not escape the odium of its English origin
in the period of bitter feelings after the war, lawyers because they
alone seemed to thrive in the economic disorganization and disturbed conditions that followed peace. These circumstances and
the radical Democratic notions of the Jeffersonian era determined
our professional organization.
Another reason operated also to shape our organization of the
bar, and to give character to our legal education. In England
the courts were centralized at Westminster. Hence, the bar was
centralized at the Inns of Court. But with us, in a country of long
distances and expensive travel, central courts entailed an intolerable expense upon litigants. We decentralized the courts of general jurisdiction at law and in equity, almost from the start, and
sought to set up a judicial organization that should bring justice
to every man's back door. This decentralizing of the judicial system involved a decentralizing of the bar. As each of the old common-law courts had its toll of attorneys, so each local court of
general jurisdiction had its own bar. There could be no such
centralized system of admission to practice, and consequent centralized control of legal education, as the control of admission by
the Innis of Court made possible in England.
While all these things were making for the system of reading
in the office of a local practitioner, which obtained in this country
until within a generation, and still obtains to some extent in cer-
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tain localities, another force was acting to promote the academic
professional training which is now characteristically American.
We received English law at the end of the 18th and in the fore
part of the 19th century. But we could not receive it exactly as
it stood in the English books. We had many things to be provided
for which English legislation and English judges had never been
called upon to consider. Much in English law was devised for social and political and economic conditions quite different from ours.
Our courts were constrained to work out somewhat rapidly a system of legal precepts adapted to a new and growing country upon
the basis of the somewhat stagnant English legal tradition at the
end of the 18th century. For half a century at least our chief
concern was to work out an American common law-to develop a
system of certain and detailed legal precepts which should meet
the requirements of American life. Apprentice trained lawyers,
knowing only the traditional technique as the practitioners had
learned it in the courts, could not rise to the exigencies of this
demand. Indeed two things quite un-English, natural law and
comparative law, played leading roles in the evolution of an American law, and for these, so far as they were made effective agencies
of shaping our legal development and directing the growth of our
law, we had to look to teachers.
Our first law schools, indeed, were but practitioners' offices.
Certainly in the case of the first school of the common law in
America, the one conducted at Litchfield, Connecticut, by Judge
Reeve, there was a transition from law office to law school with no
definite dividing line. As there were more students than in an
office, the talks of the preceptor with the student turned into dictated lectures, but the spirit and method were those of an office
apprenticeship.
On the other hand, the example of the Vinerian Professorship
at Oxford and of Blackstone's lectures suggested a different method. That example was followed eagerly in the years when American law was formative. Wythe was professor at William and
Mary in 1779-1780. James Wilson was professor at the College
of Philadelphia in 1790-1791. Kent was professor at Columbia
from 1793 to 1798. Isaac Parker became Royall professor at
Harvard in 1815. But the general lectures which they delivered
to academic audiences did no more than prepare the way. When
the Harvard Law School was established in 1817 it was essentially
a school of the Litchfield type; it afforded an improved method of
study under a preceptor in a law office. It was not until the ap-
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pointment of Joseph Story as Dane professor at Harvard that
academic lectures and professional training under the direction of
a common-law lawyer were brought into one system. Story was
a common-law lawyer, and the traditions of English legal teaching
insured that an Anglo-American academic law school under his
guidance would be a professional school. But the philosophical
ideas of the time in which Story had been trained insured that a
school over which he presided would be a school of law, not a
lawyer's office teaching rules of thumb. Also Story's zealous exposition of the doctrines of English law in the light of a naturallaw philosophy and of comparative law, enabled the school in
which he taught to remain a school devoted to the common law.
From Story and Greenleaf to Parker and Parsons and Washburn,
thence to Langdell and Ames, and thence to the American law
schools of today, is a continuous evolution. It has given us a
system of academic professional instruction that is as characteristically American as our American common law itself. It has
given us a system of legal education that grows out of and expresses the spirit of our law as completely as the Continental system expresses the spirit of the modern Roman law, and as the
English system expresses the spirit of the medieval common law.
For if the modern Roman law is jurist-made, and English law is
court-made, American law has been made by courts guided and
inspired by jurists who worked scientifically upon a proved body
of judicial experience in the administration of justice. Thus there
are two elements in our technique as distinctly as there is but one
element in the technique of the civilian and but one in the technique of the classical common law. Moreover, in the interpretation and application of constitutions we have had the same problem of developing a body of law from enduring texts, to which
the academic legal science of the civilians has been addressed for
centuries. Here also judges and teachers have each had a part.
Along with the decisions of Marshall, the teaching of Story and
of Cooley has given content to abstract formulas and determined
the technique of constitutional interpretation which has become
a distinetive feature of our law.
In the law school of a state university the American system of
academic professional legal education cannot but be espeially
fruitful. A study of the local legal institutions and of the local
law from a universal standpoint is made more effective through
a close relation between the law school of the state and the organ,
ized bar of the state. There is no gulf between academic teaching
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of law and the law of the tribunals. Each reacts upon and
corrects the other. Likewise where bench and bar are trained for
the most part in the law school of the state university, the loyalty
of the alumni which is the mainstay of American institutions of
learning, must make of the law school a center of professional life
such as we have never had in our decentralized judicial and professional organizations. Thus the sane measuring of what is by
what ought to be, the intelligent testing of theories by the exigencies of concrete controversies, and the critique of judicial pronouncements with reference to rational principles, which have become the mark of our academic law schools, may come to be a part
of the intellectual life of the whole profession.
There are many signs that our law is entering upon a new stage
of development. Already there is call for juristic creative activity
and for the same judicial resourcefulness and legislative inventive
capacity that marked the formative period of our institutions.
When we believed in the efficacy of effort, we were able to frame
the Constitution of the United States, and we were able, almost at
a stroke, to make the law of 17th-century Enigland into a law
for 19th-century America. Few creative periods in legal history
can show greater achievements in so short a time. Today we need
the same spirit, the same faith in our power to do things, the
same determination to make of our traditional legal materials a
machinery of justice under the conditions of time and place. If
we are to do our duty by the common law in the 20th century,
we must make it a living system of doing justice for the society-of
today and tomorrow, as the framers of our polity made of the
traditional materials of their generation an instrument of justice
for that time and for ours. And chiefly the responsibility for so
doing will rest upon teachers and writers, as it did when Kent
and Story published their academic lectures and assured that we
should live under the common law; and as it did when Greenleaf
gave form to the law of evidence, and when Parsons and Washburn guided the growth of our law of contracts and of our law of
property.
May the creative juristic thought and creative juristic writing,
which has been the life of American law from its beginnings, come
forth in the fullest measure from the building you dedicate today.
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